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Daniel Tiskin
ASPECTS OF NAMING AND NAMES OF ASPECTS*
Th e paper undertakes an analysis of the discussion about the presence and varieties of the de dicto /
de re ambiguity for names. I will argue that we are dealing with several phenomena here, which are 
relatively easy to confuse: fi rst, usual de re; second, a name being normally used as opposed to being 
used as in a diverging or underdeveloped dialect; third, the reinterpetation of a name as denoting a 
(temporal, cognitive, etc.) aspect of an individual. Th e second and the third phenomenon can combine 
with usual de re.
Aft er surveying the examples, I fi rst fi lter out those in which deviant dialects are manifest. Th is 
issue is resolved via a diagonalisation operation across the special dimension called “dubbing-in-force”, 
which is essentially the part of the naming conventions salient in the discourse situation. Th en the cas-
es of semantic reinterpretation are considered, where I stipulate the existence, on a par with the usual 
domain of individuals, of a dedicated domain of aspect-type entities to which a name can refer in some 
cases. Th is stipulation does not by itself destroy rigid designation, as names continue to denote rigidly, 
even if what they denote is aspects of individuals rather than complete individuals. Finally, I turn 
to customary de re readings for singular terms, where the diff erence between the aspect/individual 
contrast and the de re / de dicto ambiguity is emphasised; I provide a Quinean “double vision” scenario 
which, unlike the original version, involves aspects of individuals. Th us the possibility of superposition 
is demonstrated for the phenomena studied in the paper. Refs 25.
Keywords: de re, de dicto, formal semantics, attitude reports, rigid designators, double vision,
aspects, diagonalisation.
D. B. Tiskin
АСПЕКТЫ ИМЕНОВАНИЯ И НАИМЕНОВАНИЯ АСПЕКТОВ
Статья посвящена дискуссии о  существовании и  разновидностях неоднозначности между 
чтениями de re и  de dicto для имен собственных. Показано, что речь здесь должна идти 
о нескольких явлениях, которые не следует смешивать: с одной стороны, о de re как таковых; 
с другой стороны, о диалектных или идиолектных различиях в употреблении имен; наконец, 
о  возможной реинтерпретации имен, в  результате которой они обозначают (временные, 
перцептивные или иные) аспекты индивидов. И  диалектные различия, и  реинтерпретация 
могут сочетаться с чтением de re для того же самого имени в том же самом контексте.
Вначале рассматриваются примеры диалектных различий. Для решения этой проблемы 
вводится операция диагонализации, затрагивающая, в противоположность ее классическому 
применению у  Р. Столнейкера, особый семантический параметр  — «действующую конвен-
цию» (dubbing-in-force), которая представляет собой принятый в  данной коммуникативной 
ситуации набор значений имен. Затем мы обращаемся к случаям, в которых происходит ре-
интерпретация, где предлагается ввести, наряду с доменом самих индивидов, особый домен 
индивидных аспектов, к которым иногда могут отсылать имена. Таким образом, удается пред-
ложить общую трактовку для высказываний о пропозициональных установках и высказыва-
ний с временной модальностью. При этом нет необходимости отказываться от теории жесткой 
десигнации (С. Крипке), поскольку имена могут жестко обозначать аспекты индивидов. На-
конец, мы касаемся чтений de re в  собственном смысле, подчеркивая различие между ними 
и способность отсылать к индивиду (а не к его аспекту); для этой цели приводится сценарий, 
сконструированный по модели случаев «двойного знакомства» (double vision) У. В. О. Куайна, 
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с тем отличием, что место знакомства с индивидом в нем занимает знакомство с аспектом. Это 
показывает возможность сочетания нескольких явлений из  исследуемой группы, вносящих 
совместный вклад в семантику высказывания. Библиогр. 25 назв.
Ключевые слова: de re, de dicto, формальная семантика, высказывания об установках, жест-
кие десигнаторы, «двойное знакомство», аспекты, диагонализация.
When Frege [1] formulated his now classical puzzles about informativeness and sub-
stitutivity of coreferential terms, only the semantic diff erences arising from substitution 
could be surprising; the fact that it was names (as opposed to any other expressions with 
intuitively clear meaning) that caused the substitution problems was not especially prob-
lematic. Indeed, it was not until Kripke [2] that the view on names as rigid designators be-
came conventional. On that view (put in somewhat formally biased terms), the denotation 
of a name does not co-vary with the possible world index introduced by a modal operator, 
be it an alethic or an epistemic/doxastic predicate. Th at is, not only
(1) Aristotle might have failed to become Plato’s student.
cannot mean ‘in some possible world, the person called Aristotle in that world does 
not study under Plato’; but also
(2) Mary believes that Aristotle was not Plato’s student.
cannot have the meaning ‘in the worlds compatible with what Mary believes: the 
person called Aristotle in those worlds does not study under Plato’. (For the possible world 
semantics for belief, see Hintikka [3].)
Th is claim has been repeatedly put into doubt ever since. In Section 1, I review the 
problems that have been pointed out. In Section 2, a sub-group of problematic cases is 
treated separately as involving diagonalisation-like operations. Section 3  reviews the 
analyses proposed so far for the remaining puzzles and outlines my proposal in terms of 
aspects of individuals, as opposed both to individuals themselves and to modes of presen-
tation thereof. Finally, Section 4 ties a loose end by providing a mechanism for de re that 
can be superposed onto the aspectual semantics.
1. Th e range of explananda
One group of problematic cases is constituted by Fregean identity puzzles, some-
times complicated with what prima facie looks like contradiction but actually is not (3):
(3) Th ales believes that Hesperus is shining and disbelieves that Phosphorus is shin-
ing [4, 304].
Th is sentence is true if Th ales believes Phosphorus and Hesperus are names of diff er-
ent objects. Pelczar and Rainsbury [4] observe that (3) would be infelicitous with believes 
in both cases replaced with said; so it would be wrong to assimilate cases like (3) into the 
realm of quotation.
Saul Kripke himself also contributed to the study of such deviant examples. As Hin-
tikka and Sandu [5] indicate, Kripke’s “Puzzle about Belief ” [6] may be viewed as a de-
featist proclamation of a rigidity theorist, where it is acknowledged that rigid designation 
theory does not fare well w.r.t. “agentive” modalities such as knowledge and belief.
Some theorists have a strong tendency to interpret cases like (3) as revealing some-
thing about the rigidity problem. For instance, Hintikka and Sandu [5, p. 277] write: “If 
I do not see which of the two boys is Tim and which one is Tom, the proper names ‘Tim’ 
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and ‘Tom’ will refer to diff erent visual objects of mine in diff erent possible situations com-
patible with my visual information, that is, these names are not rigid in the context of 
perspectival identifi cation”. As will be seen below, my view on the issue, together with a 
handful of other theorists, is diff erent: one can remain agnostic about the rigidity (in the 
narrow sense) of proper names (pace the authors who insists that names are “deeply rigid” 
[7], i.e. cannot vary in denotation even in two-dimensional semantics) and still make 
sense of (3).
A related problem, also anticipated by Frege, is that of informativeness. Cf. e.g. the 
following scenario, based on Prior’s [8]: there is a certain Mrs. Murphy, who believes ev-
erything she is told (unless it contradicts something she already believes). Once she is told 
the following:
(4) Johnny Jones has measles.
Mrs. Murphy has no idea who Johnny Jones is; so she can hardly be assumed to have 
acquired a belief regarding him. Th e question is, therefore, what is the new piece of infor-
mation, if any, Mrs. Murphy has acquired upon the utterance of (4)?
Another group of problematic cases, superfi cially similar to (3), has been brought 
to attention by Saul [9] (which provoked a lively discussion, including contributions by 
Moore [10], Barber [11], Forbes [12], Pitt [13], Zimmermann [14], and Jespersen [15]). 
Consider the following pair of examples:
(5) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out.
(6) Superman went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out.
Despite the fact that, according to the fi ctional story, Kent and Superman are the 
same creature, (5) can be made perfect sense of: it means, roughly, that a person dressed 
and behaving as a newspaper reporter went into the booth and re-dressed there, so that 
he went out dressed as a superhero. In the same sort of situation, (6) would be at best mis-
leading if at all acceptable. On the surface of it, however, (5) and (6) contain no intensional 
operators, so the lack of substitability of coreferential expressions is unexpected.
Finally, Asudeh & Giorgolo [16] provide a pair of sentences they consider problem-
atic for the analyses of (5)–(6) based on the distinction between “enlightened” and “ig-
norant” uses of Clark Kent and Superman, i.e. the uses purporting to refl ect the speaker’s 
knowledge of the identity or the lack of such knowledge.
(7) Lois Lane loves Clark Kent, but she does not love Superman.
(8) Lois Lane punched Clark Kent, but she did not punch Superman.
Th e example (7) can be interpreted in a non-contradictory way even if none of the 
conversation participants pretends as if she were ignorant of the real identity; on the con-
trary, (8) cannot be so interpreted and is not subject to any “charitable” reinterpretation 
(e.g. ‘Lois’ intention was to punch Kent, not Superman, as she thought they were distinct 
individuals’).
2. Diagonalisation as a last resort
If one considers (3)  more carefully, various hypotheses may arise as to where the 
source of anomaly resides. One version is that the naming conventions Th ales uses are 
diff erent from ours to the eff ect that Th ales uses the two names coreferential in our dialect 
to refer to non-identical objects. But what exactly are those two objects then? Th ey do not 
exist in our world otherwise than as represented by a single object, viz. the planet Venus. 
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So irrespective of whether we claim a dialectal diff erence or not, there is some other dif-
ference anyway, namely whether there is one object Venus (as in the actual world) or two 
objects in its place (as in Th ales’ belief worlds). Moreover, in some intuitive sense the two 
non-actual objects exactly correspond to the two “aspects” of Venus — the heavenly body 
seen in the morning and that seen in the evening. Th is will be the topic of the next section; 
here I would like to present the dialectal variation problem in isolation.
Fortunately, the literature does contain clearer cases. One is due to Kamp [17], who 
argues that in a carefully arranged context (where it is clear that Bill takes Aldebaran to be 
the name of a certain artifi cial object, e.g. a satellite),
(9) Bill thinks that Aldebaran will be used until the 22nd century.
may be interpreted so as to ascribe to Bill an attitude towards the artifi cial object, 
not to the star (which probably cannot be used anyway). Here no “doubling” of an actual 
individual in Bill’s belief worlds is involved, and one can clearly see the dialectal varia-
tion problem in its pure form. Another such case is in fact (4) as presented above: Mrs. 
Murphy has no chance to learn who Johnny Jones is, so her dialect (unlike probably that 
of the person who told her) is underspecifi ed w.r.t. what Johnny Jones means (on a given 
occasion). (Th e predicativist literature is rather rich in cases of this kind. E.g. Bach [18] 
provides the sentence, Aaron Aardvark might have been president, intended to mean that if 
the elections were so arranged that the person whose name is fi rst in the alphabetical list 
wins, then someone called Aaron Aardvark could win. Similarly, Groenendijk et al. [19] 
come up with the following discourse: Someone has done it. It might be Alfred. It might not 
be Alfred, whose possible meaning is ‘Th is guy has done it, but the speaker is not sure if 
he is called Alfred’.)
Superfi cially, this contradicts the rigidity thesis about proper names. However, more 
or less the same puzzle may be replicated when no proper names are involved: with the 
same amount of ingenuity as we needed to force the dialect-shift ed interpretation of (9), 
one could force an interpretation of
(10) Bill thinks Mao was not a Communist.
under which (10) amounts to the following: ‘Given what Bill thinks Communist 
means, he does not think Mao was that’. (Cf. also Asudeh & Giorgolo’s [16] ex. (96).)
Th is much said, a successful solution for (9), (10) and (given certain assumptions) for 
(3) should be general w.r.t. the types of the expressions subject to dialectal variation, and at 
the same time it must be kept apart from the rigidity issues. Th e general idea of such a solu-
tion is to make the interpretation function || . || take an additional argument, which in turn 
will be manipulated by the denotation of the propositional attitude verb or depend on the 
name of the attitude holder. One possible implementation would be, following the spirit 
of Asudeh & Giorgolo [16] and the approach to quotation in Shan [20], to make the inter-
pretation function take the attitude holder index, so that the semantics of (9) amounts to
(9') For all worlds w compatible with what Bill believes at the actual world @: 
||Aldebaran||Bill is used until the 22nd century at w.
Th us for the full interpretation of (9) one would have to know the value of 
||Aldebaran||Bill, i.e. to know which object Bill calls Aldebaran. Without this piece of 
knowledge, the interpretation would be incomplete. Moreover, the question I posed in 
connection with (4) would remain largely unanswered: there is no particular denotation 
of Johnny Jones for Mrs. Murphy, so (4) will remain uninterpreted for her. Intuitively, how-
ever, she does extract some information out of (4).
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A more plausible way in this regard is to make use of diagonalisation. Th is technique 
makes sense in a two-dimensional semantics, where the denotation of an expression de-
pends on two world indices — the world of the evaluation w and the world wc where the 
meanings of the terms are fi xed. (Normally meanings are fi xed in the world of utterance, 
which is the actual world @ in the cases we consider.) Th e diagonalisation operator † 
makes an expression whose denotation depends on the pair <w,wc> (for some wc) depend 
on <w,w> instead (see Stalnaker [21]). Here are the “logical form” and the truth-condi-
tions for (9) in such a framework:
(9") Bill thinks [ [† Aldebaran] will be used until the 22nd century].
(9"') For all worlds w compatible with what Bill believes at the actual world @: 
||Aldebaran||w,w is used until the 22nd century at w. 
Th e part ||Aldebaran||w,w reads: “the w-fi xed denotation of Aldebaran in w”, or, in-
formally, “whatever Aldeberan refers to at w if its meaning is fi xed at w itself ”. Given this, 
the informational contribution of (4) for Mrs. Murphy becomes clear: it is, roughly, ‘Our 
world is one of worlds w s.t.: the individual called Johnny Jones at w has measles at w’. Un-
like under the holder index approach, this is the complete interpretation of (4).
So far, so good; one fi nal improvement is in order. Kaplan [22] has suggested a con-
straint on natural language design widely cited as Prohibition against Monsters:
(11) Th ere are no “monsters” in natural languages, i.e. there is no operator Δ changing 
the context of evaluation: ||Δϕ||w,c = ||ϕ||w,c' for some c'.
Our wc is essentially a part of the context, therefore postulating an occurrence of † 
goes against (11). Is there a way to retain the main intuitions behind (9")–(9"') and the 
proposed treatment of (4) without violating (11)? A hint in the right direction is found 
in Pelczar & Rainsbury [4]. Th ey suggest that the use of proper names (as opposed to 
e.g. common nouns, thus we have to put (10) aside) is governed by a separate parameter 
called “dubbing-in-force” and responsible for determining which dubbing conventions 
are currently employed. Th us, for instance, if I am talking to Mary, who has got a brother 
called John but is not aware that I too have a brother called John, Mary will interpret my 
use of the name John as governed by some dubbing-in-force that assigns her brother, not 
my brother, to the name John. If the interpretation function is made dependent on the 
dubbing parameter d, the information Mrs. Murphy receives with (4) may be rendered as
(4') For some d: ||Johnny Jones||d has measles.
A violation of (11) is thus avoided.
3. Aspects and naming
From now on, all the complications related to diagonalisation and dubbings-in-force 
will be sidestepped. We shall focus on a diff erent problem, namely the proper analysis of 
(5)–(8) and of (3), to the extent the latter has not yet been covered.
Th e discussion initiated by Saul [9] centered on cases like (5) and (12).
(12) I never made it to Leningrad, but I visited St. Petersburg last week.
Th e intuitive meaning of (12)  is, of course, that the speaker had never been to the 
city during the period when it was called Leningrad but visited it later. However, this does 
not follow from the standard semantics for proper names, whatever stance on rigidity 
one takes: nothing like time or tense is usually taken to be relevant for the denotation of 
names.
80      Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 17. Философия. Конфликтология. Культурология. Религиоведение. 2016. Вып. 4
Aspects. Th e idea that Leningrad and St. Petersburg may refer to diff erent temporal 
phases of the same object is present already in Saul’s paper. Similarly, in (3) Hesperus and 
Phosphorus may pick up diff erent temporal phases of the planet Venus, this time discon-
tinious: every morning the planet appears as Phosphorus, to “turn into” Hesperus in the 
evening, and so on.
As regards Superman and Clark Kent, the simplest idea would be that the diff erence 
in meaning between the two names boils down to the attire the named individual wears, 
to the eff ect that he is called Superman when dressed in the superhero style and Kent 
when dressed ordinarily. Th is simple view encounters certain diffi  culties (Barber [11], 
Saul [23]), which, however, do not seem totally insuperable; perhaps more importantly, 
Zimmermann [14] suggests that Clark Kent is more restricted in its use than Superman: 
while the latter can name the relevant individual all the time, the former is confi ned to the 
occasions when he is dressed as a reporter.
A more general approach able to encompass either (5) and its kin or (12) treats ei-
ther temporal stages of the city or “attire stages” of Superman/Kent as aspects, which may 
even be viewed as ontologically prior to individuals themselves (cf. Moore [10], Pitt [13]). 
Complete individuals are then sums of aspects.
Th ere may be disagreement, however, as to how exactly aspect dependence should be 
formalised. In theory, the restrictions on the use of names may be rendered as defi nedness 
conditions (e.g. visit Leningrad is defi ned iff  the time of the visit overlaps with the period 
when the city bore its Soviet name; Clark Kent went out is defi ned iff  at the moment he 
was dressed as a reporter) or as a full-fl edged part of the semantics (e.g. visit Leningrad 
denotes the property of visiting the city during the period when it bore its Soviet name, 
and Clark Kent went out is true iff  Superman/Kent went out dressed as a reporter). (As 
Pitt [13] notes, this is no threat to rigidity or direct reference: the name refers directly and 
rigidly, although not to the individual but to selected “slices” thereof.) I opt for the latter 
version; cf. e.g. the argument in Moore [10]: one is sometimes able to anaphorically refer 
to an aspect, such as in
(5') Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out, but he didn’t 
look happy, unlike Clark.
Let us introduce a new semantic type for aspects, called ē, on a par with the type 
of individuals e. So there can be predicates that need ē-type arguments on a par with 
those satisfi able by e-type ones. Let x, y, … be variables over individuals and a, a' etc. be 
variables over aspects, and let ⊂ w be the relation which holds at the world w between 
an aspect and the complete individual this aspect belongs to. (We will see in the next 
section how both types ē and e are employed to capture the diff erence between (7) and 
(8).) Aspects may overlap or include one another; for each individual x and each world 
w there is the maximal aspect corresponding to x at w; in that world the maximal aspect 
includes all other aspects there are for x. For instance, the maximal aspect of the city of 
St. Petersburg includes its Leningrad aspect and its St. Petersburg aspect, alongside with 
the Petrograd aspect.
At this point we can formulate the denotations for the names we encountered so far:
(13) a. ||Superman||w = ιa.a ⊂ w s
b. ||Clark Kent||w = ιa.a ⊂ w s & Reporter-attired(a)
(14) a. ||St. Petersburg||w = ιa.a ⊂ w с
b. ||Leningrad||w = ιa.a ⊂ w с & Between-1924-and-1991(a)
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Note that, although the denotation of a name depends on the world parameter, the 
semantics contains reference to a complete individual (s for Superman or c for the city 
of St. Petersburg), and w.r.t. that individual the name is a rigid designator. (Technically, 
the denotation of Superman must be the maximal aspect a satisfying a ⊂ w s, because 
otherwise the denotation of Clark Kent, an aspect which is included into the denotation 
of Superman, would be an equally good candidate. To incorporate this consideration, just 
read ι as the maximalising operator.)
Identity statements. For Pitt [13], who assumes something similar to the ontology of 
aspects (under the name of “alter egos”), sentences like
(15) Superman is Clark Kent.
are literally false, as they assert the identity of literally distinct aspects (that they are 
distinct is easily seen from (13)). Like Saul [9] and Jespersen [15] and pace Pitt [13], I do 
not think the literal truth is in this case “negotiable”; there are several ways to preserve it. 
First, one may claim that names of aspects are systematically ambiguous between an as-
pect reading and a reading under which they denote the actual individuals whose aspect 
this is. Alternatively, the copula is may take aspect names as arguments but check, in-
stead of aspect identity, the identity of the complete individuals at the world of evaluation 
(something loosely similar has been proposed by Jespersen [15]):
(16) ||is||w = λa.λa'. ιx(a ⊂ w x) = ιy(a' ⊂ w y).
Pragmatic reinterpretation. As defi ned above, Superman is applicable either to re-
porter-slices or to superhero-slices of the individual Kent/Superman. (Th is is in accor-
dance with Zimmermann’s [14] suggestion.) However, in (5) and (6) Superman is con-
trasted with Clark Kent, which according to (13) denotes an aspect fully included into 
Superman. How is that possible? One solution is suggested by Pitt [13], who claims that 
neither Superman nor Clark Kent captures the maximal aspect of Superman/Kent; another 
solution, to which I stick, is to assume that in a suitable context, the less restricted name 
Superman may be pragmatically narrowed, yielding
(13) a'. ||Superman||w = ιa.a ⊂ w s & Reporter-attired(a)
or
(13) a". ||Superman||w = ιa.a ⊂ w s & Superhero-attired(a).
4. Aspects in attitude reports
Let us now turn to (7)–(8). Unlike the fully extensional (8), (7) exemplifi es an attitude 
context, albeit not that of a propositional attitude. It is instead an objectual attitude report 
(cf. e.g. Forbes [12]), that is, a report of an attitude an agent has towards a (specifi c or un-
specifi c, imaginary or real) individual. Here we are dealing with a simple case, where the 
object of the attitude is specifi c and real. However, the opacity (non-substitutivity) of the 
attitudinal context is apparent anyway: to love Clark Kent does not mean to love Superman, 
and vice versa.
Aspects in objectual attitude reports. Apart from Pelczar & Rainsbury [15]-like in-
dexical parametrisation, a route leading to non-substitutivity is to bring some quotational 
fl avour into the semantics of objectual attitude reports. Th is would circumvent the rigid-
ity of names and prohibit substitution, and this is essentially what Forbes [12] goes for. In 
his view, an attitude report may optionally contain a silent demonstrative element so that 
refers to the particular way the object of the attitude is picked out. (Th is requires some 
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technical work, which Forbes does, because to refer to words themselves is not a common 
ability for demonstratives.) For instance, the semantics for (17) in Forbes’ terms would be 
somewhat like in (18).
(17) Lois Lane loves Clark Kent.
(18) ια.Labelled(α, soi) : UNDER(α,Loves(l,ki))
Th is means, fi rst, that Lois loves the (complete) individual Superman/Kent and, sec-
ond, that the way of thinking α about Superman/Kent relevant for Lois’ love is labelled 
k, i.e. Lois loves Superman/Kent under the guise that is named Clark Kent, not the one 
named Superman.
Why is the demonstrative optional? Th e reason is that, especially given a suitable con-
text (e.g. one where Superman is contrasted with Batman or the mayor of Metropolis), the 
situations in which (7) and (17) are true can be nevertheless described using (19).
(19) Lois Lane loves Superman.
Without Forbes’ hidden demonstrative so, (19) claims no more than that Lois is in 
love with the individual Superman/Kent, whatever her ways of thinking of him may be. 
Th e position of Superman in (19) is then fully transparent, so Clark Kent and Superman 
are intersubstitutable there.
Forbes’ semantics is rather complicated; the view on names as referring to aspects 
familiar from Section 3 comes in handy here. Th e meaning Forbes would express as (18) 
may be put just as
(18') Loves(l,[ιa.a ⊂ w s & Reporter-attired(a)])
according to the denotation of Clark Kent in (13). Th erefore, we must stipulate that 
love takes an aspect (type ē) as its “lovee” argument, whereas its “lover” argument is a com-
plete individual. In this sense, loving an aspect does not guarantee loving any other aspect 
of the same complete individual, even if the latter aspect is included into or includes the 
former (as it is with Superman and Clark Kent according to (13)). As long as punch in (8) 
is not sensitive to diff erences in aspect, we likewise stipulate that punch takes a complete 
individual (type e) as the “punchee” argument as well.
Aspects and de re. Th is may already look like “the” de dicto / de re ambiguity avail-
able for (17) and (19); however, as noted already by Jespersen [15], “[i]t is the ascriber, and 
not the ascribee Lois, who is responsible for using the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’. 
Th e ascription need not presuppose, in order to be true, that Lois know either name”. If 
the position of Superman / Clark Kent is fully transparent, whether or not Lois knows the 
names makes no diff erence (as with any de re reports, cf. Quine’s [24]). However, if the 
position is sensitive to the way of thinking (as in (18)), there is a diff erence: either (a) Lois 
knows the name Clark Kent and would say to herself, “I love Clark Kent”, or (b) she does 
not know the name although her feelings are clearly directed towards the reporter aspect 
of the individual Kent/Superman (and she may fail to know that Kent is Superman). It is 
(b) that we traditionally call de re w.r.t. propositional attitude reports.
Moreover, what if we try to reproduce Quine’s [24] double vision puzzle with aspects? 
Imagine that Lois is under the common but wrong impression that Superman is not the 
same individual as Clark Kent; she is in love with Kent, whom she knows rather well, but not 
with Superman. She defi nitely does not think, “Clark is a spy”. As for Superman, once she 
sees him sneaking around the docks wearing his superhero attire. In the darkness she is only 
able to tell him apart from Kent, but she fails to realise she has seen the renowned superhero. 
Are we not inclined to judge (20a), (20b) and (20d) true and (20c) false under this scenario?
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 17. Философия. Конфликтология. Культурология. Религиоведение. 2016. Вып. 4 83
(20) a. Lois Lane thinks Superman is a spy.
b. Lois Lane thinks Superman is not a spy.
c. Lois Lane thinks Clark is a spy.
d. Lois Lane thinks Clark is not a spy.
If we are, one might reasonably speak of diff erent ways of thinking about an aspect 
much in the same way one usually speaks of ways of thinking about an individual (as in 
Quine’s paper). Th erefore, even apart from diagonalisation (see Section 2), we need more 
than one semantic device to account for the data on names in attitude reports. One device 
is that of reference to aspects (ways of thinking); it may be employed in a given sentence 
((7) and (17)) or not ((8) and (18)). Another is some mechanism that generates de re read-
ings; similarly, it may be employed (as in (20)) or not, irrespective of whether reference is 
made to aspects or to complete individuals.
Now we can get back to (3). Perhaps the most natural reading for it is as follows: ‘Th ales 
does himself use the names Phosphorus and Hesperus, by which he refers to the morning 
aspect and to the evening aspect of what we know to be a single object; of those two as-
pects he believes that the fi rst one is shining and the second is not’. Th is is aspect reference 
without de re. I do, however, think that (3) can also have a de re reading w.r.t. Phosphorus 
and Hesperus even when aspect reference is preserved. Th e prerequisite for such a reading 
would be that for the speaker and her audience the names Phosphorus and Hesperus be 
fi rmly associated with the two aforementioned aspects, and that Th ales have beliefs about 
those two aspects even though he does not happen to use the very same names.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have made several claims. First, the observably complex behaviour of 
proper names in indirect contexts is best viewed as resulting from the interaction of several 
semantic modules. One of them, probably not limited to names but rather restricted in 
distribution, is “last resort” diagonalisation, which comes into play when it is impossible to 
construe a name as having its usual denotation. Th e remaining two modules are reference 
to aspects instead of complete individuals and the de re reading of a name. Th e former nor-
mally shows up in the contexts of “agent-involving” modality such as belief or desire, i.e. in 
attitude reports as opposed to necessity, possibility, analyticity etc. Th e latter is an instance 
of a more general mechanism that also applies to terms in alethic modal contexts.
I have remained silent in the present paper about the details of the semantics for de re. 
Th ey are indeed of lesser importance once the division of labour between semantic mod-
ules is acknowledged. As for particular implementations, the concept generator theory 
fi rst outlined by Percus and Sauerland [25] would suffi  ce for many cases of propositional 
attitude reports if a generator were allowed to take an aspect — just as well as a complete 
individual — as its argument. Some adjustments are needed to handle objectual attitude 
reports, as the latter, unlike propositional attitude reports, are not universally assumed to 
quantify over possible worlds. (Th e view that they do is called propositionalism, cf. [12, 
pp. 148 ff .].) One way for a non-propositionalist to proceed is to claim that verbs like love 
take aspect (and not propositional) arguments but trigger a presupposition to the eff ect 
that the aspect is believed by the lover to be the maximal aspect corresponding to some 
individual; this presupposition is, as any presupposition in general, a proposition, so con-
cept generators may be applied there.
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